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Abstract 
Education is increasingly coming under the shadow of economics. In this paper we will engage in 
ideology critique by applying a critical realist analysis to conventional economic models and the 
teaching of students. Through a historical and philosophical interrogation, we argue that the current 
curriculum suffers from a diminutive understanding of human being. We argue that economics 
education has for a long time now worked with a highly abstracted and decontextualized idea of 
human being which has forced other dimensions of human concerns to an absence.  We examine the 
current English Advanced level economic curriculum and the revised curriculum which will be taught 
from September 2015. Using an understanding of the dynamic of structure and agency and that 
economics operates in open systems, we argue for retroduction as an appropriate methodology.  
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Introduction 
Writing in 1942 the Austrian-born economist Joseph Schumpeter posed the provocative question: 
“can capitalism survive?” He answered, “No. I do not think it can”.1 However, in contrast to Marx2 
who believed that capitalism would eventually collapse because in its excesses it carried the seeds of 
its own destruction,
3
 Schumpeter believed that capitalism would be destroyed by its own successes.
4
 
We have mentioned these two thinkers not to arbitrate between them, but to highlight the fact neither 
of them have any significant reference in the economics taught in English secondary schools.
5
 This 
fact, in turn shows the dominance of economics education by a particular understanding of economics 
- a market economy dominated by neo-classical models.
6
 We argue that not including alternative 
conceptualisations of the workings of the economy impedes young people’s ability to adequately 
understand the world in which they live and their capacity to contemplate alternatives. In this way, 
characteristics of neo-classical economics, combined with a political neo-liberal agenda, undermine 
liberal educational goals. 
Concerns about capitalism’s health are no longer confined to academic publications. The conference 
on inclusive capitalism
7’ held in London in May 2014 speculated on the survival of capitalism in the 
context of recent financial crises.  Comments from Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England 
and Christine Lagarde, Managing Director, International Monetary Fund were particularly interesting 
as they raised concerns about realities of contemporary capitalism that are beyond the remit of the 
school economics curriculum (but not necessarily of enlightened teachers). Carney warns that there is 
a growing sense that the basic social contract at the heart of capitalism is breaking down amid rising 
inequality and he states that capitalism is at risk of destroying itself unless bankers realise they have 
an obligation to create a fairer society. He explains that market radicalism and light-touch regulation 
have eroded fair capitalism, while scandals such as the rigging of Libor markets have undermined 
trust in the financial system.
8
 He states that "all ideologies are prone to extremes. Capitalism loses its 
sense of moderation when the belief in the power of the market enters the realm of faith. In the 
decades prior to the crisis such radicalism came to dominate economic ideas and became a pattern of 
social behaviour".
9
 Lagarde
10
 informes us that the world's richest 85 people control the same wealth as 
the poorest half of the global population of 3.5 billion people and worried that rising inequality may 
be a barrier to growth which could undermine democracy and human rights. She states that if we want 
capitalism to do its job – enabling as many people as possible to participate and benefit from the 
economy – then it needs to be more inclusive and that means addressing extreme income disparity. 
                                                             
1 Schumpeter, 1943: p53. 
2 Marx 1867. 
3 Marx argued that the accumulation of capital in the hands of a few, mostly focused on the accumulation of 
profits, would lead to major conflicts, and periodical crises which would get more serious and more dangerous 
and that the system would eventually collapse. In Das Kapital, Marx predicted that workers would be goaded 
into revolution. 
4 Schumpeter predicted a gradual transformation of capitalism into socialism. One tendency would be for 
individual entrepreneurship to be replaced by mechanistic teamwork of specialised employees within large 
corporations. 
5
 2015 specifications have references to the history of economic thought which includes Adam Smith and Karl 
Marx. Schumpeter is not mentioned in the new curriculum. 
6
Brant 2011. In this, schools reflect the trends in undergraduate economics. Some schools in fact use year one 
undergraduate texts to teach at higher levels. 
7
 On 27 May 2014 global business leaders gathered at the Mansion House and Guildhall in London to attend a 
conference on inclusive capitalism. See: Inclusivecapitalism.org/. 
8 Carney 2014. 
9
 Carney 2014 p3. 
10 Lagarde 2014. 
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What might this have to do with school economics or schooling more generally? It appears that in 
English Secondary schools, neo-classical economics is the only economics taught to students. In this 
paper, we critique this orthodoxy and present alternative conceptualisations which we argue are better 
fit for purpose. School economics reflects the dominant paradigm – a neo-liberal understanding of the 
(world) economy that is dominated by mathematically modelling based on neo-classical static 
equilibrium assumptions.
11
 The pervasive neo-liberal agenda leads to a situation where a certain type 
of economics, neo-classical economics is purported to be the only respectable economics and 
therefore considered orthodox. The belief of many economists (and economics teachers) that the 
discipline is a value-free, positive subject leads to an acceptance of the status quo, and a type of 
hegemony where theories are accepted as facts and often taught that way.
12
 It is ironic that it is by 
challenging outdated theory, we may achieve more rewarding teaching & learning environments 
where students’ understanding is deepened (and their attainment in examinations improved as a 
consequence).
13
 There is a further point, economics is pervasive and has influenced education policy, 
as discussed later in the paper. Thus the flaws of one subject may have profound consequences on the 
education system as a whole.  
In the next section we argue that as far as education about economics is concerned, economics should 
be conceptualised in a broader and richer way than simply as a neo-classical approach. We will 
critique the philosophical assumptions underpinning the neo-classical methods and offer alternative 
conceptions. This will be followed by an exploration of the dominance of economics in educational 
thinking, demonstrating how this has subverted the liberal aims of education. This will be followed an 
examination of critical realism as an alternative framework for framing economic problems. This will 
be followed by a section outlining opportunities in school economics following changes to 
examination specifications. We then move to some recommendations by arguing for the need to bring 
in the question of the ends of economics to the forefront which, we argue, will require connecting the 
subject with wider moral philosophy.  
 
Neo-classical economics – the only economics? 
Robins
14
 defined economics as a science that studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends 
and scarce means which have alternative uses. This definition, or variations of it, has become a 
standard starting point for learning economics at school throughout the world.
15
 Furthermore, most 
standard economics text books distinguish positive from normative economics, the latter observed to 
be dealing with values and value judgments whereas the former is extolled for being value free and 
scientific. It is the positive economics that dominates at the school level. So both on the definition of 
the subject and its methodology, there is a claim of science and scientific method.  
Despite the subject’s roots in moral philosophy (as discussed later in the paper), economics became 
increasingly divorced from moral concerns  in the twentieth century as it aspired to a science 
underpinned by mathematical modelling of the world. This trend was part of a more general 
movement that led to the emergence of what we now call social sciences, whereby different traditions 
of studying society were seeking to be like the natural sciences.
16
 The adaptation of quantitative 
methods allows economists to make testable propositions and then to make generalizable claims and 
the adoption of such methodological approaches gives economics apparent scientific respectability.  
                                                             
11 Brant 2011. 
12 Brant 2011. 
13 Brant 2011. 
14 Robins 1935. 
15
 Brant 2011 
16 Alvey 1999. 
4 
 
Friedman
17
 asserts that economics is a pure and objective science and that it is in principle 
independent of any particular ethical position or normative judgements. He states that the task of 
economics “is to provide a system of generalizations that can be used to make correct predictions 
about the consequences of any change in circumstance. Its performance is to be judged by the 
precision, scope, and conformity with the experience of the predictions it yields. In short, economics 
is, or can be, an objective science, in precisely the same sense as any of the physical sciences”.18 
Freidman asserts that the only criterion of pertinence is if a theory works and that “realism of the 
assumptions is not important”.19 He offers the example of a minimum wage as a case in point, stating 
that arguing for such a minimum wage is a value call (to protect employees who do not have strong 
wage-bargaining possibilities). He then states that a minimum wage would increase unemployment 
and claims this to be an objective statement. Blaug,
20
 like Friedman, describes science as the ‘received 
view’.  He states that science is about observing the world around us and from observational data 
formulating universal laws that explain and predict our world. Furthermore Blaug asserts that offering 
understanding without prediction ‘short-changes’ the reader. Friedman and Blaug assert that 
economics should emulate the natural sciences and should adopt the methods of the natural sciences 
as far as practically possible. Their argument is that economics should be a positive subject and it 
should be objective in its methodology. 
As we see it, the fundamental error made by Friedman is to equate the workings of economy in a 
social and human setting with that of a physical system where causation allows a natural scientist to 
make predictive claims based on a theory. The human social context cannot be conceptualised along 
the same lines, mainly because of the agential nature of human action which makes it highly 
unpredictable and open-ended. For example, in terms of the labour market that Friedman discusses, 
we argue that the notion of ceteris paribus is itself flawed because changing one variable realises a 
whole new set of force which make the changes unpredictable. So, although according to Friedman a 
rise in minimum wage will lead to more unemployment (due to increase supply costs), a counter 
acting force is the stimulus in demand due to increase in disposable income of workers; the actual 
outcome will be a result of complex interactions of a wide range of variables, including human 
agency. Friedman’s model is flawed because it works without taking account of these human 
complexities. In this unpredictable context, moral judgements are inevitable and hence economics 
cannot be fully divorced from it. In essence we are arguing that the objects of social science are not 
just much more complicated than those of natural science but also qualitatively different.   
In addition to the conceptual problem noted above, other shortcomings of the orthodox position have 
been shown.  For example, Lawson
21
 suggests that contemporary academic economics is not in a 
healthy state and doubts the capacity of many of its strands to explain real world events or to facilitate 
policy evaluation. He further states that contemporary economics is marked by a neglect of ontology 
and an uncritical application of formulistic methods and systems to conditions for which they are 
obviously unsuited. Lawson notes the shortcomings of the deductive-nomological model and argues 
that it is time to “abandon the whole misleading positivistic perspective and its results”.22 Aldred23 
states that economics is not what is appears to be and is an odd kind of science, if a science at all and 
that many of those who call themselves economists peddle a narrow or simplistic view of economics 
to serve vested interests and political ends. Piketty
24
 asserts that an over-reliance on simple 
                                                             
17 Friedman 1953. 
18 Friedman 1953 p4. 
19 Friedman 1953 p16. 
20 Blaug 1992. 
21 Lawson 1997. 
22 Lawson 1997 p154. 
23
 Aldred 2009. 
24 Piketty 2014. 
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mathematic models and unrepresentative agents in economics has led to a neglect of important issues 
such as the distribution of wealth.  
It is clear that all is not right with modern-day orthodox economics. It is our argument that 
mainstream economists should let go of their reverence for positivistic methodology and seek 
alternative conceptual frameworks, ones that are good at understanding and addressing real problems. 
Our argument is that we need a new conceptualisation for economics; to see the subject as providing 
an explanatory function to help us understand the world in which we live (and perhaps to suggest 
ways of improving it) rather than as a predictive science predicated by flawed assumptions. We argue 
that economics should adopt a critical realist methodology and this is explored in a later section. 
 
Purpose of schools and the dominance of neo-classical economics 
A useful way to start exploring what should be the content of economics education in schools is to ask 
about the purpose of schooling.  Reiss and White
25
 suggest that we have to ask ourselves, what we 
want to achieve, rather than get bogged down with minutiae and argue about specific content. This 
appears to be particularly important for the subject under consideration, economics, as economic 
considerations have also come to dominate state policy about education overall.
26
 In fact, we aver that 
business ontology now underpins much of state policy.  
It is widely accepted that our education system is underpinned by a liberal philosophy of education.
27
 
Much of the debate about religion and education as well as faith schools, for example, is underpinned 
by liberal aims of education. Though liberalism as a philosophy has many forms, with different 
understandings of the meaning of liberty, role of the state and the function of market,
28
 it can be 
argued that the presumption in favour of liberty is the core idea underpinning all of these different 
forms. Gaus
29
 calls this the “Fundamental Liberal Principle” and Cranston notes, “By definition a 
liberal is a man who believes in liberty”.30 Liberalism takes freedom to be the natural state of humans 
and hence political authority, law and even compulsory schooling needs justification.
31
  
A child enters into a world which is already full of meanings and practices shaped by histories and 
anticipations about the future. All types of education seek to help children make sense of this world 
and find their place in it. A distinctive liberal approach to education not only does that but also aims 
to help the child grow up to find his or her own path; thus to receive the world not merely passively 
but through an act of understanding and confidence to act upon it. Thus, a key feature of liberal 
education is the goal to help children make up their minds; in other words, to be autonomous. As 
Callan notes, “the idea that schooling should help students become autonomous adults is one that 
continuous to command widespread interest and adherence among contemporary philosophers of 
education”.32 
 
Going back to Rousseau and Kant, the idea of autonomy, in the character or dispositional sense of the 
term, has been important in modern conception of liberal education and as an aim of schooling. By 
dispositional autonomy we mean, the inclination to determine one’s own actions. To possess this trait 
is to have a preference on relying on one’s own judgment, to be independent-minded, free-spirited, 
                                                             
25 Reiss and White 2013. 
26 Apple 2004. 
27 Reiss and White 2013. 
28 Fawcett 2014. 
29 Gaus 1996 p166. 
30 Cranston 1967 p459. 
31 Though there is a debate about compulsory schooling, in this paper we will take the position that there is 
justification for it, as long as the education thus provided in schools is itself a liberal education, Chamberlin, 
1989. 
32 Callan 1988, p4. 
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disposed to do thing’s one’s own way.33 Sometimes the stress on autonomy is interpreted as an 
education seeking to develop a person formed outside of all social influences. This is clearly not the 
case. Culture, socialization and listening to expertise are an essential part of being autonomous. The 
claim rather is that the individual is then able to process the information and fashion his or her own 
path – and therefore be the author of one’s life. John Stuart Mill, one of the architects of liberalism 
makes this point lucidly: 
 
it would be absurd to pretend that people ought to live as if nothing whatever had been 
known in the world before they came into it; as if experience has as yet done nothing 
towards showing that one mode of existence, or of conduct, is preferable to another. 
Nobody denies that people should be so taught and trained in youth as to know and 
benefit by the ascertained results of human experience. But it is the privilege and proper 
condition of human being, arrived at the maturity of his faculties, to use and interpret 
experience in his own way. It is for him to find out what part of recorded experience is 
properly applicable to his own circumstances and character.
34
   
Having noted the centrality of autonomy as an educational aim, we now arrive at the pedagogical 
issue of developing children’s autonomy. Clearly this is a complex issue and varies according to 
students’ profile, levels and particular subjects. Yet, it seems that one pedagogical tool widely shared 
is the diversity of exposure to alternatives; be it competing historical explanations of events, diverse 
interpretations of texts, variety of positions on existential and religious questions or vying hypotheses 
in science. As Bailey argues, opening students to points of views, traditions, literature, explanations 
and interpretations other than those that they are likely to get in the growing up processes at homes 
and in communities is to help them transcend the present and the particular.   
The possibility of autonomy increases as the opportunity for observing and imagining 
alternatives increases, since to be autonomous in decision-making a person must be able 
to imagine alternative courses of action and choose between them. This is an extremely 
important consideration for those who educate and train teachers. A teacher rigidly 
trained in a narrow conception of what it is to teach will find great difficulty in making 
autonomous decisions and adjustments in a rapidly changing social and technological 
environment.
35   
 
In the earlier part of this paper we argued that the school economics has come to be dominated by a 
particular conception of economics, neo-classical economics. Alternative conceptualisations as well 
as a critique of the dominant paradigm are rarely part of students’ education about economics. Having 
now considered both the liberal aim of developing autonomy and a particular principle to achieve it, 
we argue that the current dominance of a single perspective of economics is a barrier to the 
development of autonomy in children, at least as far as their ability to think autonomously in matters 
of finance and economics are concerned. The danger is that the dominant paradigm assumes the status 
of being ‘natural’ rather than being seen as socially constructed. Indeed the language of economics 
(e.g. the invisible hand, equilibrium) reinforces this misconception. In line with autonomy as an 
educational aim, we propose that it is important that students are exposed to the variety of alternatives 
to the issue of economic organisation, thus developing their autonomy and economic imagination. As 
we have discussed above, the dominant understanding of economics is based on conceptions that do 
not adequately take account of real life; economics has become more about modelling than 
understanding. We thus require a new pedagogical framework to help students make sense of the 
economic issues around.  
                                                             
33 Hand 2006. 
34
 Mill 1974 [1859] pp121-122. 
35 Bailey 1984 p181. 
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A related issue is that the concern with the teaching of economics is made particularly important as 
economic considerations increasingly dominating the state policy on education. Much has been 
written about the resulting impact on education.
36
 In this trend, called marketization or 
commodification of education, the practice of education is being reconceptualised and re-imagined as 
a business. Students are seen not as minds, spirit and character to be nurtured but as consumers of 
education. Schools and universities are supposed to market their programmes to these consumers and 
their parents whose satisfaction is the benchmark of quality teaching. Knowledge thus comes to be 
seen as a commodity like any other commodity which must be bought and sold in a market primarily 
for private consumption. The problem with the current trend of marketization is that its underlying 
vision of education has not been arrived through philosophical discussion but imposed through the 
dominance of an economic paradigm of a particular kind which reduces human beings to consumers 
and producers of economically measurable goods and services. The purported logic is this; the market 
is the best way to distribute goods and services; education is a good; therefore the market is the best 
way to distribute it. But, here is the flaw in this thinking. Markets have been shown to be efficient 
ways of producing and distributing certain types of goods and services, i.e. those with private benefits 
only; education is not entirely or even mostly a private good; therefore the market can at best be a 
partially useful means for its distribution. Education is also a public good and to that extent non-
market mechanisms are required for its proper distribution. 
From the perspective of this paper, the neo-liberal domination of state education policy further 
restricts the scope of teaching economics. The liberal state which otherwise should be committed to 
liberal goals of education now serves the interest of a particular economic paradigm. The 
naturalisation of the neo-classical model thus happens not only through the particular subject of 
economics but also the overall drift educational policy.  This has implications for citizenship issues 
as well. Through the dominance of an economic model as the purpose of education, education’s key 
role of nurturing critical citizenship is being forsaken. Rather than being capable of evaluating state 
policies and thereby making informed democratic decisions, the students will be indoctrinated into a 
state philosophy of a neoliberalism way of organising society. The task of revamping economics as a 
subject is thus of critical importance as this can give students the tools to evaluate not only particular 
economic policies but also the overall drift of the state. 
 
In the next two sections we argue that the concepts and theories of critical realism are a very good 
candidate for this task and to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the new content 
requirement to be implemented from September 2015. 
 
Critical realism as a conceptual framework for economics 
Roy Bhaskar first articulated critical realism in the 1970s and then developed it over the following 
four decades. It is a philosophy which is first and foremost concerned with ontology, the study of 
being. There are three phases of critical realism: basic, dialectic and meta-reality.
37
 Critical realism is 
a term derived from two connected philosophical ideas: transcendental realism and critical naturalism 
and the two together form most of what Bhaskar now refers to as basic critical realism.  
Transcendental Realism is a philosophy of science; the underpinning argument, and the basic level of 
critical realism, is that the world is real and independent of observers, but not necessarily directly 
accessible and therefore needs to be understood through the structures and mechanisms at play.
38
 As 
understood by Bhaskar, Transcendental Realism claims that intelligibility of scientific practice makes 
it necessary to assume that objects of scientific investigation exist independent of humans; they are 
structures and mechanisms rather than patterns of events; and they operate in open and closed systems 
alike. 
                                                             
36 Apple 2004; Brown & Carasso 2013; Ball 2012; Harris, 2007. 
37
 Bhaskar 2010. 
38 Bhaskar 1978. 
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Critical naturalism is a theory of social science and for Bhaskar,
39
 the key question is to what extent 
society can be studied in the same way as nature. The naturalistic tradition based on the Humean 
notion of law is positivistic with a belief that there is an essential unity of method between natural and 
social sciences. In contrast, hermeneutics offers a radical distinction in method between the natural 
and social sciences. Bhaskar argues that both are united in the error of accepting essentially a positive 
account of natural science. In contrast, he offers a qualified anti-positivistic naturalism. The third part 
of basic critical realism is the theory of explanatory critique, which attempts to show how values can 
be deduced from facts; again contrary to positivistic assumptions.
40
  
Dialectic critical realism argues that absence as well as presence, negativity as well as possibility and 
change as much as stasis, are all real functions of the world.
41
 This challenged a view which Bhaskar 
describes as ‘ontological monovalence’, by which he means the critique of a ‘flat’, actualist account 
of events in the world’.42 
  
The philosophy of meta-reality is a philosophy of hope. It is a critique of the reality of oppression 
experienced by many and argues that underneath this ‘demi-reality’ there is a meta-reality of trust and 
solidarity. It argues that recognising this deeper level and acting in accordance with it can lead to a 
universal world of human flourishing.
43
 Our arguments in this paper draw on all three phases of 
critical realism. 
Positivism arose as one of the outcomes of the Enlightenment whereby science was seen to have the 
exclusive source of knowledge and thus only way of solving problems of the universe.
44
 Bhaskar
45
 
notes that Humean theory, which forms the lynchpin of the positivist system, presupposes an ontology 
of closed systems and atomistic events and it presumes a conception of people as passive sensors of 
given facts. Contrastingly, hermeneutic approaches assumes that human action is meaningful and so 
to explain the social world one must understand it and make sense of it.  However, in contrast to both 
these traditions, critical realism offers an understanding of the world that has an ontology of human 
action and the structures and mechanisms that enable or constrain it; and a relativist epistemology in 
which human understanding is seen as hermeneutical. Hence, for Bhaskar
46
 science should be seen as 
a social process for scientists, doing their science, are causal agents who purposefully experiment and 
interact with the world. In particular in the social sciences, he argues for an ontology of structures 
where tendencies should be sought out which explain the social world.  Lawson
47
 continues Bhaskar’s 
arguments by stating that most of the constant event conjunctions that are held to be significant in 
science only occur under the restricted conditions of experimental control.  In other words, they are 
not spontaneous in nature but a product of human intervention. Science shows a reliance on human 
intervention with scientists instrumental in the process.  It is thus a characteristic error of positivism to 
ignore such interdependency, for scientists doing their science are not passive agents.   
There is another aspect, however, where scientists do not follow a Humean application of positivism, 
in their understanding of transfactuality i.e. the applicability of science theories and their result to 
open systems. Price
48
 explains that the laws of nature exist independently of the systems in which they 
occur and that reality is layered, with higher order layers emergent from lower order ones. She gives 
                                                             
39 Bhaskar 1979. 
40 Bhaskar 1979. 
41 Bhaskar 2008. 
42 Bhaskar 2008. 
43 Bhaskar 2011. 
44 Scott and Usher 1996. 
45 Bhaskar 2011. 
46 Bhaskar 1979. 
47
 Lawson 1997. 
48 Price 2014. 
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an illuminating example of scientists’ understanding of ‘moon rocks’ as a case in point. She notes that 
because scientists had knowledge of the natural transfactual laws governing the formation of rocks, 
derived from their study of Earth’s rocks, they were already equipped with knowledge about moon 
rocks before any such rocks had been made available for study and they were confident that there 
would be no sedimentary rock on the moon, since sedimentation is a process that requires the 
movement of materials such as water and wind, and neither of these is present on the moon due to its 
lack of an atmosphere. Furthermore, scientists are today confident to make highly generalised 
statements about moon rocks, their composition and the causes of their particular characteristics, 
despite having only seen rocks from three sites on the moon and despite having not actually 
witnessing the events that caused the rocks and these scientists do not feel the need to support their 
knowledge with statistically significant correlations. Price offers a witty account of what moon rock 
research might look like if scientists actually followed a positivistic methodology: 
According to research, based on samples collected from 1000 moons picked randomly from 
solar systems in the universe, there is a correlation between volcanic activity and the 
existence of basaltic rock (P <0.01). Based on this correlation, scientists claim that there is 
good reason to assume that the basaltic rock on our moon was caused by volcanic activity.
49
 
 
 
On the contrary, argues Price, scientists can confidently assume that the basaltic rock was caused by 
volcanic activity because of the transfactual knowledge that only molten magma cooling quickly at 
the surface could possibly account for the chemical and structural composition that defines basaltic 
rock.  
 
Bhaskar challenges the positivist ontology of causal laws and empirically found patterns of events and 
suggests that scientists search for the mechanisms of the production of the phenomena of nature. 
Bhaskar
50
 states that the world is composed not only of events and states of affair together with our 
experiences and impressions, but also of underlying structures, powers, mechanisms and tendencies 
that exist and these govern and facilitate actual events. Structures possess certain powers: potentials, 
capacities or abilities to act in a certain way and mechanisms are the way structured things work.  
Finally, tendencies are potentials and forces actually at work. Bhaskar distinguishes three domains of 
reality: Empirical (experience and impression), Actual (actual events and states of affair in addition to 
the empirical) and Real (structures, powers, mechanisms and tendencies in addition to the empirical 
and actual).  
As noted earlier, orthodox economics is caught in a philosophical time-warp but that there are 
alternative methodologies to positivism which are of particular value to economics and education. 
Critical realism accepts the hermeneutical starting point; a need for empathy and an understanding of 
social life and people’s subjectivity. But critical realists argue that there is more to the social world, 
for there are material realities to contend with too. Bhaskar
51
 suggest that just as in the natural 
sciences, a retroductive approach can be followed by seeking plausible mechanisms that would 
account for the phenomenon in question. These mechanisms can then be used to explain the concrete 
phenomena observed. So for a critical realist, to explain economic (or educational) phenomena it is 
necessary to determine a hypothesis of mechanism. We now apply critical realism to a specific 
example in economics. Working backwards, people experience phenomena we call ‘prices’ and these 
‘prices’ are generated by processes that we do not directly experience but which we can model or 
imagine through our reasoning. We may, for example, refer to these processes as ‘supply’ or 
‘demand’ but we do not directly experience a ‘demand curve’, a ‘supply curve’ or indeed an 
                                                             
49 Price 2014 p388. 
50
 Bhaskar 1979. 
51 Bhaskar 1979. 
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‘equilibrium’.  The actual reality that gives rise to these processes lies a step further removed from our 
experience, essentially unreachable, but that does not mean that we are not influenced by its nature.
52
 
To illustrate this, we now borrow an example from physics: magnetic forces may not be seen or 
experienced directly, but can be evidenced by moving a magnet under a piece of paper sprinkled with 
iron filings. For the social sciences, Bhaskar
53
 advocates following a ‘DREIC’ model of enquiry. 
When trying to understand a phenomenon the first step is description (as in hermeneutics) followed by 
retroduction, the process of generating explanatory hypotheses. The next stage is to eliminate unlikely 
hypotheses and by doing so identify the ones that seem to best explain the phenomenon. The final 
process is an iterative one where corrections are made and the phenomenon is examined again to see 
if the explanatory mechanism has been identified. The critical realist DREIC approach applied to 
economics offers the subject a powerful explanatory function in contrast to the dubious claims of 
accurate predictions. We argue that economics should be seen as an explanatory social science that 
attempts to address highly complex financial and social issues that face the world in which we live.  
In the next section, we explore the opportunities offered by the new content scheme to be 
implemented from September 2015.  
 
Critical realism and opportunities in school economics   
Recent changes to the A-level economics curriculum in England that we discuss below will give 
teachers scope to approach the subject in a fresh and more relevant way. A subsequent paper, ‘what’s 
wrong with secondary school economics and how teachers can make it right’54 will address these 
issues. 
It is current government policy to reform curriculum and assessment in England. A level economics 
will be assessed through linear examinations taken at the end of the normal two-year course (first 
teaching of the new specifications from September 2015). We have compared the new content 
requirements published by the Department of education (DfE) in April 2014 with existing OfQual 
(Office of Qualifications and Examinations Regulation) requirements and there are relatively few 
changes and on first reading it appears to be ‘more of the same’ and hence a missed opportunity to 
address the issues raised by heterodox economists and by us elsewhere in this paper. Nevertheless, 
there are changes and we feel they are a significant improvement on current requirements. The DfE 
aims and objectives are as follows:
55
 
1. develop an interest in and enthusiasm for the study of the subject 
2. appreciate the contribution of economics to the understanding of the wider economic and social environment 
3. develop an understanding of a range of concepts and an ability to use these concepts in a variety of different 
contexts 
4. use an enquiring, critical and thoughtful approach to the study of economics and an ability to think as an economist 
5. understand that economic behaviour can be studied from a range of perspectives 
6. develop analytical and quantitative skills, together with qualities and attitudes which will equip them for the 
challenges, opportunities and responsibilities of adult and working life 
 
These requirement do not appear to be controversial, indeed they offer the ‘feel’ of a subject that is 
relevant and analytical. The significant addition is in point 5 “understand that economic behaviour can 
be studied from a range of perspectives”. While the syllabus is still broadly neo-classical in its 
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approach, there is clear scope for examining alternative conceptualisations and to critique established 
models. The DfE document continues with a requirement of the Knowledge, understanding and skills 
states that specifications in economics must:
56
 
1. provide a coherent combination of micro-economic and macro-economic content, drawing on local, national and 
global contexts   
2. foster the appreciation of economic concepts and theories in a range of contexts and develop a critical 
consideration of their value and limitations in explaining real-world phenomena 
  
We see both these requirements as highly significant. There is now a requirement to contextualise 
economics in the real world in local, national and international contexts and furthermore for students 
to understand the limitations of neo-classical models and concepts. The DfE document further states 
that specifications must require students to:
57
  
1. develop an understanding of economic concepts and theories through a critical consideration of current economic 
issues, problems and institutions that affect everyday life  
2. develop analytical and quantitative skills in selecting, interpreting and using appropriate data from a range of 
sources, including those indicated in the Annex  
3. explain, analyse and evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the market economy and the role of government 
within it  
4. develop a critical approach to economic models of enquiry, recognising the limitations of economic models  
 
While retaining a neo-classical underpinning, the specifications now allow teachers to ‘test’ models 
and to ground economics in the real world rather than in abstracted a priori models. Again, it is 
beyond the scope of this paper to explore issues of pedagogy, but we welcome the new opportunities 
for teachers to explore economic thinking beyond the recognised orthodoxy. In terms of specified 
content, all the normal neo-classical content is present such as the margin, opportunity cost, wage 
determination, inflation and the circular flow of income, but there is an added requirement of 
criticality. So for example in the study of supply and demand, students are required to “be aware of 
the assumptions of the model of supply and demand; explain the way it works using a range of 
techniques; and use the model to describe, predict and analyse economic behaviour”. Teachers should 
now teach neo-classical models critically and have the scope to explore alternative 
conceptualisations.
58
 
We have studied the draft proposals from the largest three awarding bodies (Edexcel, OCR and 
AQA). Broadly, their stated aims and objectives reflect the DfE requirements and consequently we 
will not repeat them here. Drawing from the Edexcel draft specification, we note a number of 
interesting inclusions:
59
 
Economics as a social science: a) Thinking like an economist: the process of developing models in economics, 
including the need to make assumptions b) The use of the ceteris paribus assumption in building models c) The 
inability in economics to make scientific experiments 
Positive and normative economic statements: a) Distinction between positive and normative economic statements 
b) The role of value judgements in influencing economic decision making and policy  
Free market economies, mixed economy and command economy: a) The distinction between free market, mixed 
and command economies: reference to Adam Smith, Friedrich Hayek and Karl Marx b) The advantages and 
disadvantages of a free market economy and a command economy c) The role of the state in a mixed economy  
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Rational decision making: a) The underlying assumptions of rational economic decision making: b) consumers aim 
to maximise utility c) firms aim to maximise profits  
We are heartened by these inclusions; the Edexcel specification will allow teachers to teach 
economics in a more critical and more balanced way. Nevertheless the sample examination 
questions
60
 are still traditional with a neo-classical underpinning. So while teachers will still have to 
cover a neo-classical syllabus, at least they can do so honestly and critically. A strength of the new 
specifications and sample examinations questions is that they appear to reclaim reality from abstract 
models with questions in all three awarding bodies contextualised with relevant examples.
61
 Teaching 
for these courses will be from September 2015 with first examination of the AS level in June 2016 
and the full A-level in June 2017. 
One of the strengths of critical realism is its dynamic understanding of the relationship between 
structure and agency. Agency presupposes social structure and social structure keeps going because of 
agency.
62
 What is missing in orthodox economics is a view of economics as a social science 
incorporating both social structures and human agency. For any change to society to become 
embedded, Bhaskar argues that it must be affective on a number of levels. Bhaskar explains that every 
social event occurs simultaneously on four planes: material transactions with nature; social 
interactions between people; social structure that cannot be reduced to agency and fourthly a 
psychological element.  So while orthodox economics typically just looks at individuals from an 
egocentric point of view, abstracts from social relations and assumes the ubiquity of the market, what 
is absent is any notion of a compassionate human being who operates on a level of values and who 
cares about other human beings, human justice and the environment. While the market is an effective 
mechanism for coordinating complex economic activities across numerous economic agents, it is no 
more than that, it is a mechanism, a machine. “And like all machines, it needs careful regulation and 
steering”.63 Transactions are based on trust and on regulation so Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ would 
not exist without a visible handshake or contract. 
Among two important assumptions underlying modern economics are: First, that human beings have 
revolved around atomistic egocentricity (positivism offers a diminutive model of the human being). 
Secondly, the world can be described in terms of abstract universality (the positivist philosophy of 
science has assumed a reductionist ontology and by implication an unchanging world). Critiquing, or 
understanding the limitations of these two assumptions give rise to a critical realist critique of form 
and of content of economics. To understand economics, both ontology (there is a world of 
independent phenomena) and epistemology (knowledge is a social process) are needed. Orthodox 
economics as it stands is individualistic and lacks a social context and it is characterised by an over-
use of theoretical models that are based on unrealistic and/or dubious assumptions. Because of its 
reductionist nature, orthodox economics has no opening to other social sciences; what is missing is 
economics as a social science incorporating both social structures and human agency. Due to its 
positivistic assumptions and over-use of modelling, economics sees the world in terms of closed 
systems. Consequentially there is an overuse of the term ceteris paribus but of course in the real 
world variables do not remain the same. We agree with Lawson
64
 that it is essential to see economics 
as part of an open system for the real world is complex, with a multiplicity of mechanisms, structures 
and agencies at play. We recommend that teachers incorporate historical, social and political contexts 
to facilitate meaningful understanding of complex economic topics.  
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Reclaiming economics as moral philosophy 
Adam Smith famously wrote: “it is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer or the baker, 
that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest”.65 What did Smith mean by 
‘own interest’? It is easy to conclude that concern with one’s own interest could mean being selfish. 
However, this is not what this means: Smith shares the backdrop of the Enlightenment thought where 
it meant enlightened self-interest. Let us take a modern example were we indeed behave with 
enlightened self-interest – road traffic. Each driver on the road is ultimately concerned with arriving at 
his or her designation in a reasonable amount of time and through the optimally shortest route. Yet, if 
drivers only drove with their own self-interest in mind (for example, driving through red lights), we 
would not see the generally smooth traffic that we do. Good driving involves concern for other road 
users and pedestrians as well as taking account of road conditions. On occasions it would mean letting 
others go first where one could have forced one’s way through. It is in the context of such enlightened 
self-interest that Smith talked about self-regulating markets and the famous invisible hand. Yet, as we 
noted, it is easy to translate Smith’s words as promoting self-interest in the narrower sense. Wang et 
al
66
 explain that the language of economics makes it especially difficult to differentiate between self-
interest and greed.
67
  
University economics as taught around the world reflects the orthodoxy and school economics offers 
a simpler version of university economics
68
, where we see precisely the use of self-interest in the 
narrower sense. Thus, although completely unintentional, an increased exposure to economic theory 
may give students convenient frameworks to license greed. Research by Marwell and Ames
69
 of 
American graduates supports this hypothesis but their study findings are complex. They noted that 
comparing non-economics graduates with economics graduates was difficult: “more than one-third of 
the economists either refused to answer the question regarding what is fair, or gave very complex, 
uncodable responses. It seems that the meaning of ‘fairness’ in this context was somewhat alien for 
this group”.70 Wang et al’s71 research of Australian graduates found that studying economics leads to 
more self-interested and potentially greedy action (compared to students in an education class).  There 
appear to be a number of mechanisms working together. First, the neo-classical assumption of self-
interest maximisation appears to be pervasive and seen to be ‘natural’ with other human motivations 
being overlooked. Secondly, game theory’s emphasis of a clinical analytical approach to interpersonal 
behaviour with an implication that intelligent people will analyse their behaviours rationally and only 
focus on their own outcomes. Thirdly, the relationship between economics education and the belief 
that others also pursue self-interest creates a false consensus. It is our argument that the manifestation 
of self-interest as greed conflicts with basic moral values and is in tension with the aims of a liberal 
education. 
One of the absences noted in this paper is the lack of historicity with regard to economic thought; that 
is the absence of a historically informed understanding of economic theories. This is not confined to 
the curriculum but is true of predominant economic thought more generally. Of the few occasions 
when the history of economic thought is considered, it is rare to find those that go back earlier than 
Adam Smith.
72
 As a result, it is common to find Adam Smith, and usually a particular reading of him, 
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regarded as the founder of economics. Though this belief is not without some basis, reflections on 
economic issues go back at least to the time of ancient Greeks, particularly to Aristotle. We find 
engagement with economics in religious traditions as well.
73
 During all this history, and until the early 
nineteenth century, economics was seen part of moral philosophy. This nesting of economics with 
moral philosophy was true for Adam Smith as well. And why economics was considered part of moral 
philosophy? The answer to this question is revealing and pertinent for our times. Moral philosophy 
was part of applied philosophy, where the chief aim of reflection was to find the best means to 
achieve a goal. Economics was seen as part of moral philosophy because it was seen as a means to 
achieve ultimate ends which were set by speculative philosophy or religion. For Aristotle, the ultimate 
aim was eudemonia or flourishing, a concept wider than happiness or pleasure. In religious traditions 
the aim was salvation in the next world by leading a life of devotion in this world. For all these, and 
other, ends, economic activity was seen as necessary means.  
As Sen
74
 argues, for Adam Smith too, economics was a branch of moral philosophy. Several years 
prior to writing his famous Wealth of Nations, Smith had written A Theory of Moral Sentiments. And 
while the impact of the former (i.e. Wealth…) is widely accepted, the pertinence of ideas in the later 
is “quite often comprehensively missed in discussions today”.75  Indeed, Sen goes on to observe that 
Smith has been reduced to “a one-idea man propagating only the excellence and self-sufficiency of 
the market”.76 In fact, Smith saw capitalism as an ethical project whose success required political 
commitment to justice and freedom, not merely an understanding of economic logistics. He shared the 
Enlightenment ideal which provided him with the ends to which economics was means. It should be no 
surprise than that Smith ‘identified why the markets may need restraint, correction, and 
supplementation through other institutions for preventing instability, inequity, and poverty’.77 In this 
book The theory of Moral Sentiments he noted the importance of limitations of profit motive and 
stressed the necessity of motives other the pursuit of one’s own gain. We speculate that Smith would 
have probably shared Rousseau’s articulation of the problem to which economic thought was to be 
applied: 
 
to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force 
the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, 
may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before.
78
 
Given this goal, it was no surprise that Smith cared particularly that the poor benefited from the 
prosperity created by markets.  
No society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which the far greater part of the 
members are poor and miserable. It is but equity, besides, that they who feed, clothe and 
lodge the whole body of the people, should have such a share of the produce of their own 
labour as to be themselves tolerably well fed, clothed and lodged.
79
 
Further,  
To hurt in any degree the interest of any one order of citizens, for no other purpose but to 
promote that of some other, is evidently contrary to that justice and equality of treatment 
which the sovereign owes to all the different orders of his subjects.
80
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In Smith and in history of economic thought generally we see that a vision of what a human being is 
and what are his or her purpose is central to economic thought. He and many others did not see 
economics as an end, neither in itself nor of anything else, but a means to achieve other purposes of 
life arrived through philosophical, religious or ethical reflections. 
 
Conclusion 
In the 19
th
 century, we saw a new understanding of economics emerging, whereby economics reflected 
the technical issues of the time, rather than being a theorisation of the morality of the market, 
exchange and distribution. This was very much in line with the emergence of the idea of social 
sciences more generally seeking to emulate the successes of natural science by adopting its methods 
and presuppositions. Perhaps more than any other social science, it was economics that attempted to 
emulate natural science by purporting to be a value-free/objective discipline. Overtime the approach 
gained many adherents and became the main understanding of what economics is about. As a result, 
one no longer asks: maximization of profit for what purpose? Efficiency of market to what end? 
Growth of wealth to achieve what goal? From the perspective of our argument in this paper, the key 
issue is the consequences of the absence of historicity of economic thought. It is not just that students 
are not likely to have an enlightened understanding of the present economic thought but more 
importantly they would fail to ask the question about the purpose and ends of economics. There is thus 
an important task ahead of bringing back the reflection on the moral purpose of economics for our 
times.     
Following a governmental review of the secondary education curriculum there will be changes to both 
content and assessment of economics coming into force in September 2015. It is our recommendation 
that economics should be taught as a social science with an emphasis on its explanatory function. We 
aver that methodology should not be neglected and see a critical realist framework as a possibility for 
ushering a new paradigm in economics and economics education. 
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